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Teamster Democracy: A Moment 
of Possibility 
Nick Salvatore 
IN 1914, WHEN ORGANIZED LABOR REPRESENTED only slightly less a percentage 
of the work force than it does now, young Walter Lippmann wrote a stirring 
defense of unions and their role in American life. Fresh from service as 
secretary to the Socialist mayor of Schenectady, New York, Lippmann argued, 
in "A Key to the Labor Movement," that organized labor's very accumulation 
of the power needed to improve wages and work conditions fulfilled a far 
broader mission as well. Without powerful unions, working people would be 
doomed to "a degrading servitude." Further, "without unions industrial 
democracy is unthinkable. Without industrial democracy in industry," 
Lippmann continued, " . . . where it counts most, there is no such thing as 
democracy in America." The creation of powerful democratic unions would not 
only give working people participation in industrial decision-making but would 
also provide workers with "the discipline needed for self-government in both 
the industrial and political spheres. This impulse for "industrial democracy" 
which unions embodied did not elevate labor beyond searching criticism; but 
critics and supporters alike must comprehend that basic impulse if they would 
grasp labor's essential importance.1 
No one ever has accused the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) 
of such lofty democratic idealism. From its beginning in the decade before 
Lippmann's essay, the IBT has coupled strong leadership with conservative 
politics and frequently close relations with employers. A concern with union 
democracy never disturbed Daniel Tobin, the longtime (1907-1952) autocratic 
president of the IBT. Tobin did not seek to centralize union power in the 
national office because he favored workers' control of their union. Rather, he 
preferred, and the decentralized structure of union power demanded, that he rule 
in alliance with strong regional leaders; his attacks on truckers involved with the 
1934 strikes in both Minneapolis and San Francisco suggest how quickly the 
independent actions of members exhausted Tobin's own tolerance for union 
democracy. These tendencies intensified under the presidential regimes of Dave 
Beck (1952-1957) and Jimmy Hoffa (1957-1967). Perhaps because they had 
been powerful regional leaders who both benefitted and chafed under Tobin's 
long stewardship, Beck and then Hoffa sought to centralize power in the hands 
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of the president. In ironic fashion they utilized the idea of a regional council of 
teamsters, first developed by Farrell Dobbs and the left leadership of 
Minneapolis local 574 to build class consciousness, in order to centralize power 
in their own hands. Beck's city-wide contracts on the west coast were 
innovative in the late 1940s; while Hoffa dramatically expanded that idea when 
he gained uniform regional contracts the following decade. In each instance, 
moreover, the long struggle to wrest control from previously independent locals 
and to force employers to accept the new arrangement belied any rhetorical 
commitment to democratic principles on the part of either Teamster leader.2 
During the 1950s the IBT became associated, in the public mind, with 
organized crime. Beck, Hoffa and a host of other IBT officials faced criminal 
charges which resulted in Beck's removal as union president. Most prominent in 
the creation of this public image were the famed McClellan Committee hearings 
which had, as their public centerpiece, the explosive confrontation between 
Hoffa and the Committee's young investigator, Robert F. Kennedy. This 
connection with the "wise guys" (immortalized in Sylvester Stallone's 
incredibly inept performance in the 1976 movie, "F.I.S.T.") has dominated 
most discussions of the IBT since. It is not that the connections are fanciful or 
simply the product of a Kennedy vendetta, as Jimmy Hoffa suggested. As 
anyone who has been a teamster in certain locals, or a small employer in certain 
industries, can attest, those connections are quite real and substantial. Rather, 
the emphasis on the underworld, with its forbidden yet tantalizing associations 
in the American imagination, often obscured the actual process by which the 
union and organized crime joined their operations and thwarted an examination 
of actual union members and their conditions, aspirations and activities. 
The association between the union and the underworld, a relationship that 
young Walter Lippmann simply could not envision, did not stem from an 
insidious criminal power that somehow proved impervious to FBI surveillance. 
Rather, criminal involvement in the trucking industry may actually be the most 
lasting contribution to modern America made by those who, in the name of 
fundamentalism, prohibition and creationism, fought that modernity so 
insistently. During prohibition, organized crime's interest in the trucking 
industry grew exponentially as urban criminal groups developed enormous fleets 
of trucks to transport illegal liquor. Following repeal in 1933, the industry 
remained attractive to the underworld, both as a way to invest funds from other 
illegal enterprises and as a potential new "milk cow" that might replace the 
windfall profits accrued during the 1920s. The perishable nature of much of the 
freight carried by city drivers; the decentralized and competitive nature of the 
industry, where even threats to disrupt service could have customers flocking to 
competitors; and the rather astounding growth of the IBT during the 1930s all 
contributed to this condition.3 
Equally important were the nature of the union's leadership and the 
specifics of the member's work conditions. Despite numerous local exceptions, 
many national and regional leaders of the IBT generally understood their union 
positions less as a calling than as a potentially lucrative business proposition. 
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Investments with employers were common and some far-sighted leaders (Hoffa, 
for example) actually sought to dominate the industry itself. Employers, for 
their part, were often willing to cooperate, especially if their relationship with 
Teamster officials gave them an edge on their competitors. Throughout the 
1930s and 1940s, then, the IBT remained institutionally largely unaffected by 
the labor insurgence around it; and individual members or the occasional local 
that was so affected were usually dealt with quickly and harshly. The 
organization of the over-the-road drivers and of workers not in the trucking 
industry (both of which had long been opposed by Tobin) occurred not due to a 
new-found commitment to industrial unionism but rather from the quite concrete 
desire of the emerging leadership under Tobin to bring in more dues and to 
control larger aspects of an expanding industry. 
The major loss in this emphasis on criminal subversion, however, is the 
absence of the actual rank and file member from discussion. In many popular 
books on the union, these members are implicitly portrayed as either 
unconcerned or complicit themselves with criminal elements. But as Paul Jacobs 
wrote more than thirty years ago, being an over-the-road driver made it quite 
difficult to organize an effective opposition to corrupt leadership. Beyond the 
beatings, and threats of worse, for oppositional members and their families was 
the peculiar nature of the drivers' work conditions: "These are men physically 
isolated from each other at work," Jacobs wrote, "frequently away when union 
meetings are held, dependent upon business agents rather than fellow members 
for the protection of their rights, working in an industry to which respectability 
has been late in coming and where the police, on highways and in towns, are 
rarely thought of as friends."4 
It is not that truckers were either stupid or gangsters themselves, as the 
silence about them in such popular books as Steven Brill's The Teamsters seems 
to imply;5 but rather that after as many as seventy hours a week on the road, 
doctoring log books, fighting dispatchers and avoiding serious accident, there 
was often little energy left for union matters. As contracts improved, especially 
under Hoffa, and as he brilliantly turned his public notoriety and criminal image 
into a stirring class defense of all workers at the mercy of the rich and the 
powerful, most within the IBT accepted what they could get and viscerally 
gravitated toward "Jimmy's" defense. Even as he undermined any vestiges of 
democracy within the IBT, amassing to himself even the function of the shop 
steward,6 Hoffa became for many rank and filers an idealized image of them-
selves, a figure upon whom they might safely project their own felt weakness. In 
this manner the rhetoric of class struggle masterfully obscured a paternalistic, 
even semi-feudal relationship. It was a stunning, and destructive, performance. 
BECAUSE IT IGNORES MUCH OF THIS COMPLEX HISTORY, James Neff's book, 
Mobbed Up,* is not a very satisfying book. A journalistic account rather than a 
* James Neff, Mobbed Up: Jackie Presser's High-Wire Life in the Teamsters, the 
Mafia, and the FBI (Atlantic Monthly Press), 1989. 
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full biographical treatment of Jackie Presser, Neff's book nonetheless lacks the 
searching thoroughness of the best of contemporary reporting. Although Neff's 
digging into the FBI files is commendable and useful, ultimately he is unable to 
develop an adequate framework to interpret that material. Neff's portrait of 
Presser and of the union's history in the post-Hoffa years rarely goes beyond an 
almost sensational fascination with crimes and crime figures. To the extent that 
this story requires telling, Neff provides us with more than sufficient detail. But 
his fascination with the underworld, and the stream of often irrelevant gossip 
that carries that burden, is ultimately inadequate as a narrative structure. 
Neff argues that Jackie Presser was a rather inept individual who 
essentially followed the lead of others in seeking the presumed respectability of 
a business career within the confines of a trade union structure. Presser's 
singular skill, Neff states, lay in his uncanny ability to position himself between 
sharply contending forces and, in counter-weighing the dangers association with 
each carried, to keep himself alive. Appropriately, then, Neff begins his 
discussion with Bill Presser, Jackie's father, the product of a middle class 
Jewish Cleveland neighborhood. By age thirty Bill organized the Dry Cleaners 
Association which, despite promises to improve labor relations, actually forced 
these small businessmen to pay for protection and in return "negotiated" 
reduced wage contracts for the workers. From dry cleaning Bill expanded to 
other industries and, in 1944, he included Detroit's jukebox industry. There 
Presser first met Hoffa who, in exchange for lucrative payoffs, helped Presser 
establish his new "organizing" drive. As in Cleveland, Presser used local 
gangsters to threaten recalcitrant businessmen and unionists. 
The relationship between Presser and Hoffa deepened, especially as the 
union sought to "organize" the vending machine industry. A protege of Hoffa's, 
Bill joined the IBT in 1951 and, within the year, was running both Joint Council 
41 and the Ohio Conference of Teamsters. As a Teamster, Presser's approach to 
unionization remained as it had been since the 1930s; in exchange for high 
payments, in the form of professional association dues, businessmen were 
guaranteed labor peace and dramatically lowered wage contracts. To this basic 
structure Bill added certain new wrinkles. He found it useful, Neff writes, to 
hold considerable hidden assets in the companies whose workers he now 
represented; and, leaving no stone unturned, he found the union itself a rich 
source of wealth in the form of kickbacks, false billings, and multiple union 
salaries. Girding these activities, of course, as Neff continually reminds us, was 
an intimate association with organized crime. As Allen Friedman, Presser's 
brother-in-law who had known connections with the underworld, recalled, "Bill 
Presser told them, 'you better do what I say or my brother-in-law will kill you'." 
It was during this same time that the older Presser took his first steps in 
aiding Presser fils to make the difficult transition to adulthood. Twenty years old 
and a Navy veteran in 1946, Jackie was at loose ends and quickly became 
involved in a variety of petty crimes. In the early 1950s Bill presented his son 
with a business agent's position with Local 274, Hotel and Restaurant 
Employees Union. Jackie proved so inept that, in 1958, a judge quite friendly 
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with the father nonetheless ordered the son removed from office and forced him 
to repay thousands of dollars illegally taken from the union treasury. Bill 
Presser, quite 'Upset, nonetheless established Jackie in a series of business 
ventures, funded by IBT money; but they too failed. Despite the fact, as one 
union lawyer would say, that "Jackie Presser couldn't read a labor contract if his 
life depended on it," Bill's paternal concern led him to try yet again. In 1966, 
with the active support of Hoffa, Bill raided other IBT locals and forced their 
members into a new unit, Local 507. He placed two associates in executive 
positions within the new local and indicated his intent to send more members the 
local's way. Suitably giftwrapped, the father presented his son with the 
secretary-treasurer's position. 
With the establishment of Local 507, Jackie finally found his way. In 
classic fashion he inherited the family business and, in contrast with the 
pioneering efforts of the founders, added few new wrinkles over time. Guided 
by his father until his death in 1981, Jackie successfully negotiated the 
destructive turbulence that marked national Teamster politics in transition from 
Hoffa to Frank Fitzsimmons to Roy Williams. On the local and state levels, 
Jackie finally implemented the lessons in organizing his father had taught. As 
Anthony "Tony Lib" Liberatore told federal investigators in 1982, "Jackie 
Presser gets a piece of everything." 
THE ATTEMPTED DESTRUCTION OF ALL BUT THE MOST VENAL form of union 
solidarity by massive subversion by many leaders over generations of this most 
powerful union is a legacy that weighs heavy on Teamsters and trade unionists 
in general. Yet there is a perverted humor in the sordid tale. One key to Jackie's 
ultimate "success" lay in the fact that, all along, he was a regular active 
informant for the FBI. Nicknamed "The Tailor" in 1969 and renamed 
"ALPRO" in 1982, Presser provided a constant source of information for 
federal authorities on organized crime's involvement with the union. But in this 
as in every other aspect of his union experience, Jackie followed in others' 
footsteps. During the early 1970s, both Pressers and Frank Fitzsimmons fed 
information to federal sources to neutralize the jailed Hoffa's union loyalists. 
Hoffa himself, of course, had done the same for Dave Beck fifteen years before. 
In this light, then, the federal suit brought against the IBT by the Reagan Justice 
Department had elements of comic farce in it, as different divisions of the same 
department sought simultaneously to imprison and to protect Jackie. Shortly 
before Jackie Presser became IBT general president in 1983, he told a close 
friend that "I'm not going to take the job unless I get the blessing from the 
government and the boys." Those elements of comic farce turn tragic when one 
realizes that this sham unionist got both. 
If Walter Lippmann was unable to imagine the levels of systematic 
corruption that would structure the development of this union, James Neff has 
not been able to see beyond that corruption. As a result his ultimate analysis, 
that Jackie sought to "turn his collar" by envisioning himself as a corporate 
executive in a union atmosphere, is both weak and not exactly new. Hoffa, 
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Beck and Tobin had all exhibited such tendencies, as had numerous officials of 
other unions even without the corruption that marked the IBT experience. This 
narrow focus limits Neff's overall interpretation. By not examining regional 
differences within the union, rank and file members themselves, the quite sharp 
differences among the general presidents since Tobin, or the dramatic 
transformation of the economics of the trucking industry during Presser's years 
of influence, Neff of necessity focuses on the titillating imagery of organized 
crime. This prevents him from evaluating Presser's years as president and from 
understanding the current election, the first open election in memory, for the 
position of general president of the union. 
Jackie Presser's most profound legacy is not, as Neff states, his FBI file. 
Rather, beyond the corruption issue, Jackie symbolizes a union leader without a 
clear program of how to survive the economic turmoil of the 1980s. In a certain 
way the ostentatious trappings of power that obsessed Jackie should be 
understood as camouflage: in contrast with Hoffa, an almost ascetic leader who 
crafted national contracts of significance, Jackie simply could not deliver. 
Presser's obscene displays of regal power were meant to obscure that fact. Yet, 
Jackie's personal deficiencies are not sufficient to explain these failures. The 
transformation of the trucking industry during the 1980s is critical to any 
understanding of Presser's years in office and of the expectations embedded in 
the current IBT election. 
By any standard the Teamsters, with 1.1 million members in 1989, remain 
quite a powerful union, the largest in America. That figure, however, can be 
misleading. Since 1978, the IBT has lost some 800,000 members, more than 
half of that figure since 1987. As with the union movement in general, 
Teamsters in public sector employment represent a growing proportion of new 
union members. Currently 39 percent of all unionists, these workers generally 
face relatively little opposition to organizing from their governmental 
employers. This stands in sharp contrast with employers in the private sector 
and thus even figures that suggest an overall growth may indeed mask a 
weakened bargaining stance. A massive hemorrhaging has devastated the 
trucking industry. As recently as 1978 some 23 percent of all Teamsters were in 
the industry; a decade later, in the face of declining overall membership, the 
figure is 9 percent. Where 42 percent of workers in the industry were Teamsters 
a decade ago, that figure now is below 30 percent and falling.7 
THESE FIGURES SUGGEST THE DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES FACED BY even the 
nation's strongest union. Nor does the evidence allow hopes for a quick 
turnaround, at least in trucking. Deregulation and the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 
have altered the basic structure of the industry. More than one-third of transport 
companies with revenues of a million dollars or more in 1974 were no longer in 
existence 8 years later. By 1987 the number of viable national carriers was 
reduced to under ten. The basic cause for this restructuring was the competition 
unleashed by new government policies. As Thomas L. Friedman wrote in 1982, 
as a result of deregulation and the 1980 Act, "an industry that for 45 years was 
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as controlled as a utility has been thrown wide open, creating free-for-all 
competition where before there was virtually none." No longer able to pass on 
costs to consumers through federally regulated rate increases, companies now 
fought for market share within two broad categories: less-than-truckload 
(necessitating numerous pick-ups, sorting depots and delivery routes) and 
truckload (a straight run, with a full trailer, between two points). Even as the 
competition eliminated poorly run and/or unlucky companies, the emergence of 
these two concentrated markets wrought havoc with what remained of 
traditional IBT bargaining in the industry. As Michael Belzer has recently 
argued, deregulation resulted in a segmented industry that could simply ignore 
the traditional uniform wage package that had been a hallmark of national 
Teamster negotiations since Hoffa. In the process the union remains strong in 
the less-than-truckload segment while it continues to lose members among 
inter-regional and national over-the-road drivers.8 
That Jackie Presser had little aptitude for these problems is evident; but it 
may be less clear that there were some IBT officials who sought solutions. 
Norman Weintraub, IBT Director of Research, and other officers at both 
national and regional levels made concerted efforts to respond to the crisis. But 
to respond to demands for concessions by companies in economic difficulty 
meant breaking with the very concept of the national agreement that had been a 
centerpiece of IBT policy since the glory days of Hoffa's reign. Such policy 
generated resistance from many union officials and, in dividing the rank and 
file, it created among members even more complex attitudes toward their union. 
In 1982, for example, some 1,000 union drivers struck Hemingway 
Transport, Incorporated. Hemingway was one of approximately 200 regional 
companies that demanded concessions and withdrew from the National Master 
Freight Agreement. IBT Local 701 rejected these demands and ordered the 
strike. In so doing union officials reacted from within a model of 
labor-management relations that, however well intentioned, may no longer have 
been operative. In the two years preceding the Hemingway strike, 144 carriers, 
employing over 18,000 workers, permanently closed their loading docks; 
another 47 carriers, with more than 22,000 additional workers, faced severe 
financial difficulties. Some of the striking drivers understood the bizarre new 
circumstances. "We want to give concessions," one driver stated, "we're 
willing to give up a lot. But we can't walk away from the union." Another, 27 
years a Teamster, etched the dilemma more sharply: "We're in the middle. We 
want to give the company a break but the union won't let us." The product of 
neither turncoats nor poor unionists, these sentiments accurately reflect the pain 
and confusion of a work world roiled at its very core. How to respond remains 
today a question not yet solved.9 
WITH THE COLLAPSE OF THE NATIONAL AGREEMENT and in the absence of any 
coordinated policy to replace it, the IBT itself no longer looks as powerful to its 
members as it once did. Lacking strong internal structures open to democratic 
involvement, Teamsters, especially in trucking, have increasingly looked to a 
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group of union dissidents for ideas about the future of their union. Over the past 
two decades Teamsters for a Democratic Union (TDU) has struggled against the 
union hierarchy. The right to democratically elect union officers and a more 
aggressive stance against concessions have been central demands. Although 
consisting of but 10,000 members, TDU's influence is far broader. Its monthly 
newspaper, Convoy-Dispatch, circulates widely among union and non-union 
drivers nationally and its volunteer lawyers have provided innumerable 
members with concrete assistance in filing grievances against union officials and 
employers alike. By itself it is doubtful that TDU would have won the right to 
the coming election as quickly as has occurred: the entrenched union officials 
resisted the idea and were anything but squeamish in using force against these 
men and women. While victories did occur in some areas, as TDU-endorsed 
slates ousted local officials, maintaining those victories proved difficult in the 
face of overwhelming opposition from regional and national Teamster officials. 
But the out-of-court settlement to the Justice Department suit required IBT 
compliance with a federally-run national election for general president. That 
external federal pressure broke through the internal official resistance to 
democratic forms; this, in turn, led to the emergence of a viable national reform 
candidate in Ron Carey. As a result we are living through a rare moment of 
possibility within the Teamsters. 
The basis for this hope lies in the strengths that TDU and Ron Carey offer 
at this critical time. Current and past members of TDU comprise a national 
network which will prove valuable to the campaign and which can funnel 
specific local grievances and concerns to Carey and his staff. TDU is well know 
for its commitment to democratic reform; but among IBT members it is also 
respected for its consistent opposition to a series of concessionary contracts 
endorsed by Teamster officials. Although not previously associated with TDU, 
Ron Carey's history evidences an equal dedication to rank and file reform. 
Elected as a reform candidate to the presidency of Local 804 in New York in 
1967, Carey cut official salaries, eliminated the unlimited expense account, and 
reoriented the local toward addressing the members' needs. Some twenty years 
later, Carey earns but $45,000 as president of a 7,000 member local, the largest 
local of United Parcel Service (UPS) workers in the nation. Although long 
excluded from policy decisions within the IBT, Carey's reputation for honesty 
and committed leadership has won him a national following within the 
industry.10 
But there remain serious obstacles to electoral victory, obstacles that the 
pressure of an election in autumn 1991 might not allow either TDU or Carey the 
time to overcome. The first obstacle, of course, is the opposition from the sitting 
officials. Legal resistance has already been intense;11 while most observers ex-
pect an increase in violence as well, if Carey is seen as posing a serious threat. 
The second difficulty concerns the nature of TDU's and Carey's constituencies. 
Although efforts are being made to broaden both, these constituencies reflect 
primary strength among truckers. Teamsters in the trade and'service sectors of 
the economy (nurses, teachers and municipal workers, for example) are not well 
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represented in the reform movement. With continued hard work this may change 
but it remains a serious obstacle to a Carey victory. 
Finally, the economic crisis in the trucking industry may play a critical role 
in the campaign. Concessions are indeed painful but, as the recent UPS 
agreement suggests, that pain can motivate workers to react in a variety of 
ways. In addition to wage issues, the basic issues in these negotiations 
concerned company demands for greater freedom to employ part-time workers; 
the creation of a two-tiered wage structure; and the size of cost of living 
increments over the three years of the contract. The final company offer achieved 
a first in recent union history: IBT officials, including general president William 
McCarthy, TDU dissidents and Ron Carey all urged members to reject the 
proposal. With 118,554 members voting (approximately 80 percent of UPS 
Teamsters), the contract offer was accepted by the solid margin of 55 percent. 
Even the threat of a strike in the crisis atmosphere of the industry, where rumors 
abounded that the Postal Service or the non-union Federal Express Corporation 
would increase their market share, proved too dangerous for many workers to 
accept.12 How this tension will affect the election remains to be seen. 
In all probability Walter Lippmann would have welcomed this new sense 
of the possible within the Teamsters. If true self-government results from this 
election, it will revitalize the IBT and could have a wide impact throughout 
organized labor. But not even the most enthusiastic supporters would suggest 
that this campaign might usher in an era of industrial democracy. That moment 
of possibility has long passed, obscured now by the twentieth century's harsh 
treatment of the more optimistic understandings of such terms as industrial 
unionism and industrial democracy. Nor, more realistically, would a Ron Carey 
victory remake the IBT overnight. There would remain deeply entrenched 
pockets of autocracy throughout the union that could be expected to forcefully 
resist reform initiatives; while the profound economic problems faced in the 
trucking industry (and in other sectors of the economy represented by Teamsters 
as well) could foster serious internal division. Given the forces arrayed against 
him it is more than possible that Carey will not carry the election in 1991. That 
prospect then raises a most complex political and tactical problem for both 
Carey and TDU: how to commit fully to the election while simultaneously, 
without preaching defeatism, preparing supporters for a longer struggle.The 
nature of that longer struggle is, however, quite complex. In contrast with 
Jimmy Hoffa, who was able to use his considerable skills to take optimal 
advantage of an expanding and decentralized industry, no Teamster president in 
the foreseeable future will have anything like that advantage. The new market 
configurations that reflect this transformed industry preclude any quick return of 
union power. The long term effect of the crisis in the Middle East on all aspects 
of transportation adds an additional level of uncertainty. In such an atmosphere 
it should not be surprising if the reform campaign fails of outright victory. But 
the broadening and strengthening of this democratic movement over the next 
year, in conjunction with the federal oversight, will, at the minimum, 
structurally weaken the absolutism of top regional and national officials. That is 
WINTER m 1991 • 101 
not all that is needed or desired but it remains unclear just now the full extent of 
this moment of possibility. 
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